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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Abstract 
A commonly cited criticism of the DoD is inefficiency in its acquisition process that leads to a 
high potential for waste. The purpose of this study is to explore whether the DoD’s 
institutional setting and related bureaucratic structure prohibit leaders and policymakers from 
effectively implementing private sector best practices related to strategic sourcing, especially 
demand management. Demand management requires an organizational mindset supporting 
the governance of production and consumption within a commodity group. A qualitative, case 
study research methodology was used to explore whether the DoD’s institutional framework 
permitted the utilization of strategic sourcing processes, such as demand management. 
Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson’s theoretical framework and related argument that public and 
private sector organizations differ from each other according to three distinct mediums (legal, 
economic, and political) was applied. Interview data and document artifacts were fractured 
and coded, then grouped into categories using a modified grounded theory strategy. Key 
findings suggest that the DoD’s current acquisition structure permits a limited application of 
demand management and the private sector’s key success factors given certain political, 
legal, and economic modifications.  
Research Questions 
Despite the many urgings and initiatives for improved acquisition processes and 
methods, the DoD continually fails to implement acquisition reform measures that would 
produce the desired change. Specifically, the DoD and its bureaucratic aversion to change 
is unable to adopt commercial best practices. Regarding its acquisition of commercial goods 
and services, the private sector best practice of strategic sourcing remains absent from the 
DoD’s standardized acquisition practices despite the fact that the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) mandated its use in May 2005. As such, inefficient and tactical acquisition 
processes continue to produce wasteful spending practices. This problem negatively 
influences the American taxpayer, the DoD, and the customers that it supports, most notably 
the warfighter.  
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A possible cause of this problem is the outdated structure of the DoD’s acquisition 
system and the procurement function’s limited, administrative role in the overall acquisition 
process. This study investigates commercial best practices, such as strategic sourcing, and 
the government’s limited success in applying them could assist in remedying this problem. 
The purpose of this study is to explore whether the DoD’s institutional setting and 
related bureaucratic structure has prohibited it from effectively implementing strategic 
sourcing practices. This study applies the theory and research asserted by Chubb and Moe 
(1990) to determine whether the findings—that the institution itself and its outdated 
bureaucratic processes are the root causes of inadequate performance—also apply to the 
DoD acquisition system.  
In order to pursue why the DoD is unable to implement strategic sourcing practices 
across its acquisition platform, we propose the following three research questions: 
1. To what extent does the DoD acquisition structure limit its ability to practice 
strategic sourcing? 
2. Given certain DoD initiatives, what variables/modifications were instituted that 
promoted successful strategic sourcing practices? 
3. Is it possible to mirror these successful examples and apply them on an 
enterprise-wide basis across the DoD acquisition platform? 
Literature Review 
To appreciate the magnitude of the study’s research questions, it is first necessary to 
analyze and detail seminal literature that focuses on bureaucracies and organizational 
theories, as well as some of the key differences among the public and private sectors as 
they pertain to these constructs. These two overarching themes each play a significant role 
in determining whether public sector agencies and departments are successful, or whether 
they possess the potential to be successful, in adopting private sector practices. 
Following this analysis and prior to exploring strategic sourcing articles from 
academic journals, a thorough examination of successful strategic sourcing practitioners 
offers insight into lessons learned, critical success factors, and other related details. This 
portion of the literature review highlights which strategic sourcing practices, traits, and 
components have proven to work and which may or may not be transferable from the private 
to the public sector.  
Classical Literature 
Theorist Herbert Simon (1997) eloquently detailed the importance of organizations in 
his landmark work Administrative Behavior: 
Organization is important, first, because it provides the environments that 
mold and develop personal qualities and habits. Organization is important, 
second, because it provides those in responsible positions with the means for 
exercising authority and influence over others. Organization is important, 
third, because, by structuring communications, it determines that 
environments of information in which decisions are taken. We cannot 
understand the inputs or outputs of executives without understanding the 
organizations in which they work. Their behavior and its effects on others are 
functions of their organizational situations. (p. 18) 
Despite the increasing literature and focus on how bureaucracies are changing, 
traditional bureaucracies continue to run the federal government and, as such, they should 
be analyzed and studied to measure their impact on government operations. Assuming that 
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Simon’s (1997) theory that organizations affect the inputs and outputs of those who work 
within them, ignoring organizations makes any study focusing on government processes 
and initiatives incomplete.  
Simon (1997) asserted a clear distinction between administrators and the economic 
man. Administrators, according to Simon (1997), satisfice rather than maximize, implying 
that they can make decisions without knowing or ascertaining all the facts (p. 119). Simon 
supported this theory with decades of management and human behavior observation and 
research. If one were to accept Simon’s assertion that administrators act in a satisficing 
manner, then administrators can and will make decisions with established rules. Simon 
(1997) characterized these rules as “relatively simple rules of thumb that do not make 
impossible demands upon their capacity for thought” (p. 119). Perhaps this characterization 
best explains the myriad of rules that Wilson (1989) detailed at length that continue to run 
the American bureaucracy. 
Many of the bureaucratic tenants detailed by Weber (1922) and Wilson (1989) 
continue to dictate the composition and character of modern bureaucracies, including the 
DoD, which remains the largest department within the executive branch in both budget and 
population. Academics and practitioners alike have challenged the usefulness and efficiency 
of traditional bureaucracies over the past century, and these critiques and suggestions 
warrant consideration in view of the changing demands and expectations placed upon these 
organizational entities. 
Although the claim that Weber (1922) is the founder of bureaucracy lies outside the 
scope of this research project, it is safe to label him as the first known academic to define 
bureaucracy’s attributes and promote their use. Andreski (1984) asserted that Weber was 
the first to recognize the inevitable bureaucratization of modern governments and nation 
states, which is one of the most significant predictions in the field of public administration. 
Weber (1922) outlined the basic characteristics of a bureaucracy, focusing on strict and 
ordered rules, hierarchy among employees, written documents that guide the management 
of the modern office, managers who were recognized experts, and office management who 
followed general rules, which can be learned (pp. 50–51). 
Bureaucracy and rules complement one another. Typical connotations of 
bureaucracies initially generate images regarding rules and regulations, a concept that 
Weber (1922), and nearly all theorists who touch on bureaucracy, detailed at length. Wilson 
(1989) asserted, “The United States relies on rules to control the exercise of judgment to a 
greater extent than any other industrialized democracy” (p. 342).  
The DoD, perhaps more than any other executive department in the United States 
federal system due to its size and complexity, contains a seemingly infinite set of rules and 
regulations. For example, the rules that guide the DoD procurement processes are divided 
into several layers, including the federal acquisition regulations; the DoD FAR supplement; 
the DoD procedures, guidance, and information; as well as a host of local agency 
procedures, policies, and regulations. As of July 1, 2010, the FAR and DFARS alone are 
2,074 and 954 pages, respectively. These exhaustive, overlapping rules do not include the 
procurement and acquisition rules put forth by the OMB in the form of directives, policy 
memos, and circulars, for example. A contracting officer (CO) in the DoD requires several 
years of both training and on-the-job experience to grasp these rules well enough to be 
granted a warrant that permits an officer’s actions independent of a supervisor. That said, all 
CO actions over a certain dollar threshold, which vary depending on the action as well as 
the agency, must still go through a legal review to ensure the proper application of these 
inherently complicated regulations, further illustrating the multitude of rules and regulations 
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employed in running the DoD. Although industry has its own review processes, it typically 
falls far short of the lengthy, bureaucratic process imbedded in DoD agencies. 
Regarding the topic of rules and the order that they produce, Weber (1922) focused 
on three primary tenants: First, regular activities are fixed in such a manner to be labeled as 
official duties. Second, the authority to give commands is strictly outlined and followed 
(Weber, 1922, p. 50). Third, only those with the qualifications and authority are employed 
and are done so in a continuous manner. Whether these primary characteristics of how 
rules are implemented and sustained remain valid in today’s environment warrants serious 
debate; however, regardless of one’s opinion on this particular topic, the fact remains that 
some degree of these characteristics is evident in today’s DoD.  
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) focused several publications in the early 1990s on 
public- and private sector differences in an effort to highlight the need for change and, more 
broadly, for the public sector to begin adopting private sector practices and processes. 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) in Reinventing of America stated, “We embrace our rules and 
red tape to prevent bad things from happening, of course. But those same rules prevent 
good things from happening. They slow government to a snail’s pace” (p. 111). There are 
certainly official duties in the DoD, and the authority to perform and authorize certain actions 
are clearly spelled out in a host of policies and regulations. These actions and authorizations 
are limited to those officials who are granted explicit authority to act on behalf of the DoD. 
Focusing on the topic of defense acquisition as an example, each defense agency has its 
own set of rules and policy memorandums that carefully and explicitly outline the authority 
levels of certain employees and their respective positions. At a higher level, each defense 
agency and each of the defense services must follow the highly integrated DoD Instruction 
5000.02, which is the lengthy guide that details the multitude of approvals, documents, and 
authority levels that serve to uniformly control the acquisition of major defense acquisition 
programs. In short, Weber’s (1922) intense focus on the rigidity of rules within a bureaucracy 
is a characteristic that continues to flourish in the DoD. 
Wilson (1989), citing Weber as well as his own experiences, supplemented these 
thoughts on rules with his own assessment regarding the gains and losses produced by the 
rigid application of rules that Weber promoted. Wilson (1989) asserted that the difficulty lies 
in  
striking a reasonable balance between rules and discretion is an age-old 
problem for which there is no ‘objective’ solution .… At best we can sensitize 
ourselves to the gains and losses associated with the governance by rule 
rather than by discretion. (p. 342) 
In the world of defense acquisition, the line between rules and discretion is anything 
but concrete. For example, nearly all the rules have exemptions specifying that government 
officials can employ their own discretion. However, the constantly changing political realities 
and pressures frequently determine the practitioner’s ability to use such exemptions and 
related discretion.  
Demand-Side Management 
Demand-side management involves the use of financial incentives, market 
mechanisms, education, efficiency measures, or other programs to modify the demand for a 
product or service (Strengers, 2011). The demand management process attempts to identify 
specific sources of demand so that procurement organizations can ameliorate the risks 
associated with sources of demand. Demand management attempts to control when or 
where demand occurs in order to match it efficiently with available capacity and smooth 
highs and lows of demand into a more consistent requirement level (Jack & Powers, 2009). 
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In the DoD, demand often expands to the level of funding allotted for a supply or service. So 
rather than demand driving funding and procurement, funding drives demand. 
Jack and Powers (2009) identified examples that might occur in the health care 
industry, such as an aging and growing population, the increase in some diseases while 
others are reduced, demand for new treatments and therapies, insurance allowances for 
procedures, and the prevalence of managed care. 
As we identified previously, organizations are impacted by politics and individual 
limitations are commonplace. In these circumstances, individuals have differences in 
preferences as a result of their value systems and bounded rationality. These different 
preferences impact the sourcing of products and services (Cox, Chicksand, & Ireland, 
2005). These differences also serve as major sources of resistance to the adoption of 
enterprise-wide sourcing strategies.  
Public and Private Sector Organizational Structures: A Comparative Analysis 
Although organizational theory, similar to studies on management, generally does 
not differentiate between the public and private sectors, there are common characteristics, 
traits, and features. The subtle differences that do exist can and do have profound 
consequences when attempting to implement similar processes and practices. Academics 
Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson (1989) clarified this point and published a comprehensive 
text that focused on the uniqueness of organizational theory as it applies to the public 
sector. Although these authors admit that the lines that once separated the sectors have 
somewhat blurred due to increasing public sector laws that uniformly apply to both sectors, 
as well as outsourcing, the public sector’s push toward commercial practices, and so on, 
they still convincingly argued that the public sector demands its own focus on organizational 
theory. 
Gortner et al. (1989) asserted three fundamental components that separate public 
agencies from their private counterparts: legal, economic, and political nature and roles. 
These authors argued that public and private organizations differ “in this most profound way: 
It is the business of public bureaus to administer the law. … Compliance with private rules 
and regulations is voluntary: Non-compliance in the public sphere may result in coercion or 
force” (pp. 19–23). 
In their landmark essay “Comparing Public and Private Organizations,” Rainey, 
Backoff, and Levine (1976) mirrored the thoughts above regarding the unique legal 
differences between the private and public sectors and the impact that these differences 
creates. Regarding the constraints of the legal system that applies to the public sector, 
Rainey et al. (1976) claimed that these constraints limit the public manager’s choices as to 
both entry and withdrawal of certain undertakings (p. 238). In short, the legal environment 
that guides the public sector frequently undermines its ability to freely choose its 
undertakings and related practices and processes, a fact that is rarely noted or appreciated 
by the public it serves. 
The economic differences between the public and private sectors can be succinctly 
summarized by the fact that a private entity is largely motivated by profit whereas a public 
agency must blend efficiency with political and legal concerns, and mandates, some of 
which were discussed previously. For example, many of the political embargoes and trade 
restrictions placed by the United States were instituted due to political concerns, not to 
enhance profitability. 
Although private entities do not operate in a vacuum, they certainly avoid the type of 
interference and political pressure noted by Gortner et al. (1989). Allison’s (1979) landmark 
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presentation comparing the sectors and highlighting their fundamental differences 
specifically noted this point. Allison (1979) asserted, “Government managers tend to have 
relatively short time horizons dictated by political necessities and the political calendar” (p. 
29). Allison’s point adds complexity to the position of a public administrator, who must 
balance political demands within narrow timeframes, a dangerous combination that 
inevitably creates hurried and frequently inefficient processes. An examination of the 
practitioner literature will illustrate the key success factors (KSFs) that are inherent in any 
strategic sourcing program. 
Practitioner Literature: Key Success Factors 
The overlapping themes regarding what practitioners claimed were necessary 
ingredients for successful strategic sourcing implementation and what academia is 
discovering through research are plentiful. We identified a host of repeating suggestions and 
criteria for a successful strategic sourcing program emerged from the literature. These 
criteria, or key success factors, can be categorized into the following high-level headings: 
the overall status of the purchasing function, effective leadership within the organization, the 
ability of strategic sourcing teams to cross functional areas, and working jointly with 
suppliers in an integrated fashion in contrast to establishing an arms-length relationship. 
This final KSF includes developing suppliers in addition to simply working together. The 
following analysis synthesizes the existing literature’s contribution to these KSFs.  
Status of the Purchasing Function 
As mentioned by Baldwin et al. (2000), Moore et al. (2002), Laseter (1998), and 
others, practitioners have publicized the need for purchasing to cease its stereotypical role 
of serving as an administrative or clerical function. Driedonks, Gevers, and van Weele 
(2010) stressed this point in their study regarding how to manage the effectiveness of 
strategic sourcing teams when they asserted, “Although things have changed dramatically 
over the last decades, the purchasing profession has a history as a clerical function” (p. 
109). Driedonks et al. (2010) claimed that the ability of strategic sourcing to create a 
competitive advantage is what has largely raised the prominence of the purchasing function 
(p. 109).  
Because the DoD has not altered the status of its purchasing function since it 
attempted to implement strategic sourcing in May 2005, perhaps because it does not have 
to compete in the marketplace and establish any type of competitive advantage, it would not 
satisfy this KSF. Johnson (2005), whose memorandum implemented government-wide 
strategic sourcing in the federal sector, did not establish any type of strategic sourcing 
organizational structure or make any mention of acquisition process and procedures. In 
short, Johnson’s OMB memorandum mandated a commercial best practice but maintained 
the status quo in terms of the existing status and role of the purchasing function.  
Kocabasoglu and Suresh (2006) enhanced the notion of increasing the status of 
purchasing when they asserted that successful strategic sourcing implementation depends 
on purchasing and supply managers partaking in the organization’s strategic processes (p. 
7). The typical DoD framework—whereby requirements are generated and provided to the 
purchasing function to simply administer an order—falls far shy of the type of strategic, 
organizational integration that Kocabasoglu and Suresh label as a KSF. Schneider (2011), a 
professor of contract management at the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), asserted the 
following thoughts regarding the status of the purchasing function within the DoD: 
We may teach the acquisition lifecycle and use of Integrated Product Teams 
but the reality is that in many DOD organizations, procurement is not 
engaged until far too late in the acquisition planning process. This means the 
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value add of the business advisor is minimized and it is no surprise that 
contracting is seen as more of an administrative paper-pushing function. 
(Personal communication, March 28, 2011) 
Ogden, Rossetti, and Hendrick (2007) confirmed the importance of this KSF, offering 
that the purchasing literature has identified “status within the organization” as one of the key 
determinants of purchasing’s strategic influence (p. 4). The DoD’s failure to break through 
the bureaucratic, stove-piped nature of its acquisition system and purchasing’s continued 
administrative role will inevitably add to the challenge of implementing strategic sourcing 
initiatives and practices. 
Effective Leadership 
Wisma, Schmidt, and Naimi (2006) asserted that significant resources need to be 
focused on leadership in order to properly manage the inevitable change that accompanies 
a strategic sourcing initiative (p. 174). Wisma et al. (2006) argued that such an initiative 
without an effective leader to manage the significant change that stems from executing 
strategic sourcing practices will surely lead to failure. Although Johnson’s (2005) OMB 
memorandum directed agencies to implement strategic sourcing was addressed to senior 
leaders within the executive departments—the chief acquisition officers, chief information 
officers, and chief financial officers—there was no guidance on how to lead the inevitable 
change that this initiative would create. Further, the leaders who received this OMB tasking 
were to do so in a minor, part-time capacity, further emphasizing the weakened approach 
employed by the OMB in instituting this commercial best practice.  
By comparison, the private sector typically hires experts with leadership skills whose 
sole focus is to drive successful strategic sourcing initiatives. In reviewing the organizational 
structures and leadership roles of private sector firms that have experienced successful 
strategic sourcing programs, it turns out that their leaders are focused on the primary 
mission of ensuring that their programs exceed the established goals and metrics. Klein 
(2004) included this approach as one of the three key steps to excellence. Klein (2004) cited 
Prudential as a best-in-class case study in his research and stated how its strategic 
contracts manager led the needed change (p. 24). This senior-level executive focused on 
driving effective strategic sourcing practices in the company. This type of focus is not only 
lacking but is frequently altogether absent in the DoD environment. 
The federal government’s approach was to add this challenging initiative to the 
countless other duties assigned to their senior leaders, and to do so with a flat-lined budget. 
In this instance, the federal government reverted to the hierarchical structure and tasked the 
senior-most leaders who delegated down to their subordinates in hopes of some level of 
progress (Johnson, 2005). Referencing Simon’s (1997) thoughts, the outputs of executives 
cannot be understood without understanding the organizations in which they work (p. 18). 
Regarding the implementation of strategic sourcing in the federal sector, the important trait 
of leadership was handled in the bureaucratic fashion by tasking and delegating in lieu of 
the commercial approach of hiring dedicated leadership to ensure that the proper level of 
focus and energy supported the initiative (Johnson, 2005). It is not a failure of leadership but 
an organizational failure that best explains the outputs of the federal and, more specifically, 
the DoD leaders. This possibility should be kept in mind moving forward. 
Leadership’s impact on strategic sourcing has been studied, albeit only with private 
sector data. Hult, Ferrell, and Schul (1998) examined the impact of leadership on a set of 
individual purchase outcomes related to the sourcing process. Hult et al. (1998) studied 
leadership’s impact on an organization’s purchasing cycle times and relationship 
commitments, both critical measurement’s in assessing an organization’s success in a 
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strategic sourcing environment. Although Hult et al. (1998) divided leadership into multiple 
categories, the underlying hypothesis that leadership impacts purchasing outcomes was 
confirmed in their study.  
This is not to imply that effective leadership alone ensures that strategic sourcing 
initiatives experience success. For example, when Hawkins, Randall, and Wittmann (2009) 
researched factors contributing to the use of reverse auctions, a tool frequently used by 
strategic sourcing teams, they illustrated that leadership was not a contributing factor. 
Hawkins et al. (2009) revealed that leadership in their study only proved to be marginally 
significant and negatively related to the use of reverse auctions (p. 65). Although still 
marginally effective and considered by most to be a critical part of successful strategic 
sourcing practices, leadership alone does not guarantee positive outcomes from a strategic 
sourcing perspective. 
Cross-Functional Representation 
The internal coordination of purchasing with other functions is a KSF that relies 
heavily on internal communications. Freytag and Mikkelsen (2007) stressed the importance 
of this KSF, stating that the managerial challenge of managing relationships is critical in 
implementing strategic sourcing. Freytag and Mikkelsen (2007) asserted, “The key to 
success is that all parts of an organization cooperate, and that no part of the organization 
passively or actively shows a reluctant attitude to handling the tasks” (p. 189). Internal 
communication and managing relationships across the DoD’s vast, stove-piped acquisition 
system is difficult to effectively execute.  
Acquisition is comprised of a handful of job series, although this handful varies from 
agency to agency. These job series, ranging from contracting officers to program managers 
to engineers to logisticians, contain their own training, competencies, and skill sets that 
rarely overlap, thereby exacerbating the limited view and scope of a DoD acquisition official 
(Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2010). For example, DAU is responsible for teaching 
certification courses to the DoD acquisition workforce. The DAU website (2011a) put forward 
the following clarification: “The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act required the 
Department of Defense to establish a process through which persons in the acquisition 
workforce would be recognized as having achieved professional status” (para. 1).  
Each DAU campus is divided up into six departments: contract management, 
logistics, program management, systems engineering, business, cost, and finance (DAU, 
2010). The certification courses provided by the DAU rarely overlap, and the instructors 
employed to teach them typically teach only within their limited area of expertise. This 
approach serves only to heighten the stove-piped nature of the DoD acquisition system, 
making the internal coordination of purchasing with other functions altogether impossible. 
Mookherjee (2008) studied the criticality of moving toward a flatter organization as 
opposed to traditional vertical organizations that typically define government bureaucracies 
if an organization is to effectively practice strategic sourcing. Mookherjee asserted that 
companies are therefore moving, and sometimes being forced, away from the classical, 
vertical structures toward those that are more flexible (p. 72). The current DoD 
organizational structure and its stove-piped nature violate the tenants of flexibility and 
horizontal platforms that Mookherjee’s research endorsed.  
In a study similar to Mookherje’s (2008) study, Gopal, Viniak, and Caltagirone (2004) 
outlined a model to achieve a strategic sourcing that relies heavily on the effective use of 
cross-functional teams. Gopal et al. (2004) asserted, “The project’s success depends 
heavily on the team’s formation. Purchasing, logistics, operations, engineering, and finance 
all need to be represented on the team” (p. 56). Again, considering that the DoD currently 
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hires, trains, and works according to functional area, each particular function is frequently 
ignorant regarding the roles and responsibilities of their counterparts in the other functional 
areas.  
Mills (2010), a former program manager in defense-related acquisition and current 
DAU professor of program management, recently asserted the following list of barriers that 
limit the DoD’s ability to form integrated product teams: lack of empowerment, unclear goals, 
poor leadership, unreasonable schedule, insufficient resources, and lack of commitment (p. 
31). This translates the tasking of a joint cross-functional team into a monumental challenge, 
at least for the DoD bureaucracy.  
This is not to imply that the DoD has not long been warned regarding the need to 
shift from a functional, narrow focus toward the industry standard of cross-functional teams. 
For example, Dupray (2005), a contracting officer for the U.S. Navy, detailed the need to 
transform the DoD’s stove-piped approach to acquisition and move from a functional 
approach toward a joint, strategic approach (p. 8). Despite the OMB policy letters, countless 
executive reports, and supporting literature from the private sector, the massive bureaucracy 
that is the DoD requires fundamental, organizational change to truly shift from its existing, 
single functional area focus, which unfortunately prohibits, or at least limits, strategic 
sourcing processes. 
Buyer–Supplier Relationships 
Information sharing and the development of key suppliers are two of Kocabasoglu 
and Suresh’s (2006) KSFs that come close to violating the ethical standards and statutory 
regulations that guide the federal sector’s acquisition system. The DoD acquisition system, 
from a purchasing perspective, is guided by the federal acquisition regulations, which place 
the concepts of fairness and competition above these KSFs, regardless of their importance 
in executing strategic acquisition practices. For example, FAR 3.101-1 offered the following 
guidance: 
Government business shall be conducted in a manner above reproach and, 
except as authorized by statute or regulation, with complete impartiality and 
with preferential treatment for none. Transactions relating to the expenditure 
of public funds require the highest degree of public trust and an impeccable 
standard of conduct. The general rule is to avoid strictly any conflict of 
interest or even the appearance of a conflict of interest in Government-
contractor relationships. (General Services Administration [GSA], 2011, 
section 3) 
It is easy to decipher why contracting officers are hesitant to establish long-term 
relationships with suppliers because the FAR clearly articulates that complete impartiality 
shall guide the DoD acquisition process.  
The current bureaucratic structure of the DoD and the lengthy list of regulations that 
guide it prohibit certain buyer–supplier relationships that serve as common practices in the 
private sector (GSA, 2011). For example, FAR 15 details how contracting officers are to 
treat all competing industry partners fairly to ensure equity and justice in the federal 
contracting process. FAR 15.306(e) specifically stated, “Limits on exchanges. Government 
personnel involved in the acquisition shall not engage in conduct that favors one offeror over 
another” (GSA, 2011). When these rules are violated, the losing contractor in a competitive 
process has the legal right to protest the government’s decision.  
FAR 33, which covers protests, disputes, and appeals, is dedicated to outlining the 
processes and procedures afforded to contractors for submitting protests when it suspects 
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that the government violated the regulations. For example, Northeast Military Sales (NEMS) 
protested the Defense Commissary Agency’s decision to award to another, competing firm. 
NEMS won the protest and the Defense Commissary Agency had to restart its entire 
acquisition process because it failed to properly follow the rules regarding the engagement 
of industry suppliers. In its ruling, the GAO (2011) asserted, “NEMS broadly challenges the 
agency’s technical, past performance, and price evaluations, as well as the adequacy of 
discussions. We sustain the protest” (“Decision” section, para. 1). The reference to 
discussions in the GAO decision highlights the government’s continued failure to properly 
engage with industry. This recent case illustrates the complexity involved regarding the 
DoD’s use of this particular KSF. 
In line with KSFs that promote successful strategic sourcing implementation, Towers 
and Song (2010) provided that long-term purchasing arrangements are necessary between 
buyer and supplier to ensure a strategic relationship that will lead to effective strategic 
sourcing practices (p. 542). There are a host of bureaucratic hurdles that make this KSF 
difficult to achieve, including the budgetary system that funds DoD acquisitions, the 
restrictions regarding the use of multiyear funds, the current administration’s intense focus 
on increasing competition, and so on. For example, the DoD uses various categories of 
money to fund its acquisitions, all of which have strict time limits regarding when they can be 
obligated and the purpose that they are used. Operations and maintenance money, for 
example, must be used within the year that it is provided or it expires. Further, it can only 
fund contracts for a period of 12 months, further emphasizing the point regarding the 
difficulty for the DoD to establish long-term relationships with suppliers.  
To illustrate the complexity regarding the DoD’s ability to establish long-term 
relationships with suppliers, consider the following DoD guidelines established in the DAU’s 
(2011b) CON 216 Legal Considerations in Contracting course: “Annual appropriations are 
made for a specified fiscal year and are available for new obligation only during the fiscal 
year for which made. Routine activities of the federal government are, for the most part, 
financed by annual appropriations” (p. 206). It is obvious from the literature that the long-
term relationships promoted by strategic sourcing experts far exceed the one-year time limit 
that is typically established in the Appropriation and Authorization Acts. 
In the summary of their study, Chan and Chin (2007) claimed that managing and 
collaborating with suppliers early in the process offers companies a competitive advantage 
(p. 1407). This competitive advantage escapes the largest buying entity in the world 
because of its bureaucratic rules that continue to prohibit it from applying commercial best 
practices. 
Although strategic sourcing has yielded enormous savings for industry over the past 
20 years, the majority of strategies focus on the interactions with suppliers through contract 
award. The management of the strategy in the post-award phase has had comparatively 
little attention paid to it. This is a reflection of contracting’s perceive administrative role 
(Hughes & Wadd, 2012). 
KSFs Summary 
The four KSFs detailed in the previous sections are all limited when considering the 
existing institutional structure that guides the DoD acquisition system. Although both 
scholars and practitioners may argue over which KSF is most critical to an organization that 
is implementing or practicing strategic sourcing, the overlapping themes were constant. 
Thawiwinyu and Laptaned (2009) executed a detailed study on the impacts of strategic 
sourcing on supply chain performance management. In their literature review, they asserted 
the following as the main elements of strategic sourcing: strategic elevation of the 
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purchasing function, internal coordination between supplier and purchasing, long-term 
relationships with suppliers, and supplier involvement in planning and design. Their 
assessment assists in validating the fact that these elements or KSFs are constant and 
need to be massaged into the DoD institutional setting if the DoD expects to realize the 
utilization of strategic sourcing processes.  
Thawiwinyu and Laptaned (2009) asserted, “Firms that implement strategic sourcing 
experience significant improvement in their supply chain performance management, 
specifically in terms of responsiveness and satisfaction of customer” (p. 20). In an era of 
budget cuts, multiple war efforts, and overall economic uncertainty, the DoD should focus its 
efforts mightily on how to properly implement strategic acquisition practices so its customers 
(the warfighter as well as the taxpayer) can experience increased customer satisfaction, 
however that might be defined (e.g., increased savings, better service, decreased delivery 
times, etc.). Further, the potential regarding positive social change associated with the 
reallocation of financial resources is tremendous serving to heighten the demand for 
strategic sourcing in the DoD and, more broadly, in the public sector. 
Research Methods 
Considering the research questions and their exploratory nature, combined with the 
fact that the academic literature revealed little information on strategic sourcing in the public 
sector, a case study methodology is the best approach for this study. Recognizing that the 
literature on strategic sourcing in the public sector is limited illustrates that this truly is an 
exploratory study. This research effort focuses on the United States Air Force and its 
Strategic Sourcing Program Management Office (SSPMO), referred to as the Air Force’s 
Enterprise Sourcing Group (ESG). To properly assess the impact of how the DoD could 
adjust its existing organizational structure to better promote strategic sourcing practices, a 
program that has illustrated progress in this realm naturally had to serve as the case study. 
Additionally, if the research question of whether a modified strategic sourcing program could 
be applied on an enterprise level within the DoD is to be explored, a program that has 
illustrated the ability to execute strategic sourcing within the existing regulations had to be 
selected. The Air Force’s SSPMO readily meets these requirements.  
This study utilizes both an archival and documentation review, as well as interviews, 
in an effort to compile as much data as possible and to ensure a comprehensive, 
triangulated approach. The archival records and documentation review were analyzed by 
the Gortner et al. (1989) framework that characterizes public and private sector differences 
along three distinct mediums: legal, economic, and political (see Table 1). The interviews 
were conducted along the private sector’s KSFs that emerged in the literature review.  
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 Air Force Strategic Sourcing Archival Records and Documentation 
Mapped to the Gortner et al. (1989) Framework Categories 
Air Force archival record or documentation Gortner et al. (1989) framework 
(Legal/Economic/Political) 
IG5307.104-93 AF Strategic Sourcing and 
Commodity Council Guide (U.S. Air Force, 2010a) 
Legal 
Charter for the Air Force Civil Engineering 
Commodity Council (U.S. Air Force, 2010c) 
Legal/Political 
Charter for the Air Force: Air Force Medical Service 
Commodity Council (U.S. Air Force, 2010b)  
Legal/Political 
Charter for the Air Force Furnishings Commodity 
Council (U.S. Air Force, 2010d) 
Legal/Political 
Strategic Sourcing Task Group Final Report Briefing 
to the Defense Business Board (DBB, 2011) 
Legal/Economic/Political 
ESG’s (2011) Strategic Alignment and Deployment 
Briefing to the Air Force Materiel Command 
Legal/Economic/Political 
ESG Strategic Sourcing Briefing to the Air Force 
Materiel Command (AFMC; Knipper, 2011) 
Legal/Economic/Political 
State of the ESG/Follow-up to AFMC/CA Briefing to 
the Air Force Materiel Command (Shofner, 2011) 
Legal//Political 
ESG Strategic Planning Charters Legal/Economic/Political 
The strength of this study lies in the fact that the methodology aligns with the 
research questions that are guiding it. The approach to triangulation assures that the 
research questions are explored and supported by a myriad of viewpoints and data sources, 
thereby strengthening the data and related analyses.  
We conducted a rigorous case study using a single unit of analysis, the United 
States Air Force SSPMO, with multiple cases, which are the three commodity councils. In 
this case study we incorporated three data sources, and synchronized the results of the 
documentation and archival records analyses, executed through the Gortner et al. (1989) 
organizational framework, with follow-on interviews of the employees running the referenced 
commodity councils. This comprehensive approach to triangulation, along with the detailed 
steps to minimize or eliminate the validity threats, ensures that the proposed research 
questions are pursued with academic rigor. 
Research Findings and Impact on DoD Acquisition 
The archival records and documentation review clearly provides invaluable insight 
into this study’s research questions. That portion of the study highlighted how the DoD’s 
bureaucratic structure does not limit an agency’s ability to launch a strategic sourcing 
program, which alone validates the usefulness and contributory nature of this research 
effort. The extent to which it may limit an agency’s ability to successfully employ strategic 
sourcing practices remains somewhat less defined.  
In the best of circumstances, demand managers must address a number of 
challenges that occur when meeting requirements including product over specification, 
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premature or tardy establishment of specifications, frequent changes in specification, poor 
or non-existent demand information, fragmentation of spend, maverick buying, agency 
politics, and the risk-averse nature and culture of the organization (Cox, Chicksand, & 
Ireland, 2005). Our findings indicate that each of these challenges is exacerbated by the 
DoD bureaucracy.  
Product overspecification occurs when individual users are permitted to define 
requirements, rather than a team of experts representing the enterprise requirements. 
Premature establishment of specifications may limit the sourcing team’s ability to negotiate a 
solution with suppliers, or to identify current state-of-the-art or alternative best-value 
solutions. Changes in specification make the organization susceptible to changes in price 
from suppliers that may increase total cost. Poor demand information deprives the 
organization of making informed decisions and puts them at a negotiating disadvantage. 
Spend that is dispersed to more vendors than necessary increases transaction cost; 
however, the political environment that DoD buyers work in requires attention with regard to 
small business vendors. The risk-averse nature of DoD buying organizations is exacerbated 
by the penalties assessed when an innovative strategy proves unsuccessful.  
The ESG’s ability to work around the legal, political, and economic differences to 
continue to push its program forward is a testament that the limitations imposed by the DoD 
bureaucracy can be overcome or, perhaps more appropriately, circumvented. The ESG was 
able to modify certain processes and regulations to work around barriers. This seemingly 
simple achievement highlights the greater impact of applying the ESG’s approaches, 
processes, lessons learned, and achievements toward other DoD agencies and services. 
Additionally, the idea that an enterprise-wide DoD strategic sourcing program could take 
root is within the realm of the possible, a thought that traditional bureaucrats would likely 
dismiss. 
The interview data illustrate that the Air Force ESG, operating under the same rigid 
DoD acquisition structure as its peers, was able to explore and achieve varying degrees of 
success with respect to the KSFs that emerged in the literature. The research results 
detailed in this study revealed that the ESG was able to significantly advance the status of 
the purchasing function as well as the concept of cross-functional representation on the 
strategic sourcing commodity councils. Although progress was evident in the data, this does 
not imply that the ESG reached a maturity level equal to its private sector peers. Some of its 
shortcomings (e.g., bureaucratic processes that result in inefficient reporting structures and 
limited number of SMEs on the commodity councils) are likely related to the organizational 
structure and the related limitations that this produces.  
The KSFs focusing specifically on effective leadership and engaging suppliers in a 
collaborative manner have witnessed success to a lesser extent than the aforementioned 
KSFs. The limited but nonetheless noteworthy ESG successes in these specific KSFs are 
easier to tie to the DoD’s bureaucratic structure. For example, leadership within the DoD is 
still focused on tactical and narrow-minded approaches that tend to focus on supporting only 
those initiatives that leaders either own or are at least personally invested in versus the 
strategic approach of supporting initiatives that benefit the organization. Similarly, the 
bureaucratic culture and rules surrounding fairness and competition makes the full 
realization of the final KSF that focuses on supplier collaboration difficult, if not impossible, 
to witness in the short term. 
This research provides a solid baseline for both the ESG and its DoD counterparts to 
recognize what can be initially achieved, which KSFs are more difficult and may require 
additional support or changes, and which approaches, measures, and processes have 
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proven most effective. Although more detailed answers to these questions will only be 
possible over time, this study has produced significant and worthwhile information that will 
prove useful to the Air Force and, more broadly, the DoD as it continues to move toward 
more strategic sourcing and related acquisition practices. 
Although the DoD acquisition structure limits its own ability to efficiently establish and 
promote strategic sourcing processes, it does not block it entirely. ESG employees 
expressed confidence in the fact that, over time, its program will mature. It has already made 
significant progress in two years within a bureaucratic structure that has solidified its cultural 
norms over the past 50 years. This encouraging thought demands additional research, 
especially in light of the positive social change that will naturally stem from the DoD’s ability 
to realize effective, robust, strategic sourcing practices and programs. 
This research effort has produced obvious demands for action from DoD acquisition 
leadership, related policy leaders, and practitioners alike (e.g., contracting officers and 
program executive officers). The fact that the ESG was able to effectively initiate a fully 
functioning strategic sourcing program management office within the boundaries of the 
same bureaucratic environment that guides and governs its peers mandates that other DoD 
agencies and Services take the initiative to implement strategic sourcing practices and reap 
the myriad benefits that it offers. 
As a leader in this particular space, the Air Force ESG should meet with its DoD 
counterparts to review both its successes and failures. It should explore how its peers can 
and should follow in its footsteps and actively partner with them in establishing similar PMOs 
at their respective services and agencies. The ESG should also record a baseline for its 
current position and benchmark it against its goals and private sector peers to determine 
how much further it can advance its current progress and what it will require to do so. The 
ESG should map out these next steps for the critical stakeholders and leadership who can 
and should help it achieve its goals. In lieu of begging for additional leadership support and 
better cross-functional representation, the ESG should be more proactive in gaining the type 
of leadership and stakeholder support that will endorse these supportive measures and 
drive it from the top down. These types of aggressive pursuits pose potential gains that 
more than justify their endorsement. 
Significance of This Study 
The purpose of this exploratory case study research effort was to initiate an 
investigation into whether the DoD’s bureaucratic structure limits its ability to practice 
strategic sourcing. The resulting data illustrate that although the structure may have a 
limiting effect, it certainly does not prevent implementation and potential success in a 
number of strategic sourcing processes and areas. The legal, environmental, and political 
differences between the public and private sectors did not prevent the Air Force’s ESG from 
successfully launching its SSPMO and from achieving initial success stories. This research 
should ultimately prove valuable for its discoveries that strategic sourcing success is 
possible within the DoD, that the ESG’s success is likely transferable to other DoD services 
and agencies, and that the KSFs required for success can be implemented and achieved, to 
some degree, within the DoD’s bureaucratic environment.  
We are pragmatic enough to stipulate that the bureaucratic and risk-adverse nature 
of DoD procurement will change little in the near future. As a result, the routinized tasks that 
are currently repeated with each transaction that procurement organizations conduct will 
also continue. We propose that strategic sourcing can make a significant contribution in this 
area by accomplishing those routinized tasks a single time for a group of products or 
services. Such a strategy will yield significant process cost savings for the enterprise.  
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Even with these discoveries, this field of research begs for additional studies and 
more granular, targeted focus areas. For example, the ESG must explore how to better 
achieve each of the four KSFs within DoD regulations if it seeks to mature its existing 
SSPMO. Another key area of focus for the ESG should be to better understand how to 
restructure its acquisition function areas in the hope of doing a better job at achieving the 
stated KSFs. The ESG’s peers should explore and study how they can mirror the ESG’s 
success, improve on the existing lessons learned, and team with the ESG to drive cross-
agency and department collaboration. 
Examining the broader topic of private sector practices within the federal sector is 
another area that is ripe for exploration. This strategic sourcing case study could be 
expanded to examine the topic of commercial best practices within the federal sector and 
what is (and is not) possible or, perhaps, what is (and is not) warranted or, perhaps, what is 
(and is not) necessary in these challenging fiscal times. 
All considered, the purpose of this study was to launch the necessary investigation of 
how to apply efficient commercial practices within a seemingly rigid bureaucratic 
environment. This research is meant to initiate the larger and much more focused, follow-on 
research that is hopefully waiting to be explored by other scholar-practitioners in the field of 
public administration.  
References 
Allison, G. T., Jr. (1979). Public and private management: Are they fundamentally alike in all 
unimportant respects? In Proceedings for the Public Management Research Conference (pp. 
27–38). Washington, DC: Office of Personnel Management.  
Andreski, S. (1994). Max Weber’s insights and errors. London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Chan, T. C. T., & Chin, K. S. (2007). Key success factors of strategic sourcing: An empirical study of 
the Hong Kong toy industry. Industrial Management and Data Systems, 107(9), 1391–1416. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/index.htm?PHPSESSID=eu1d3lot4iqrvjstd61udbr9r0Cox  
Cox, A., Chicksand, D., & Ireland, P. (2005). Overcoming demand management problems: The scope 
for improving reactive and proactive supply management in the UK health service. Journal of 
Public Procurement, 5(1), 1–22. 
Driedonks, B. A., Gevers, J. M. P., & van Weele, A. J. (2010). Managing sourcing team effectiveness: 
The need for a team perspective in purchasing organizations. Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, 16, 109–117. doi:10.1016/j.pursup.2010.03.007 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU). (2010). FY 11 DAU iCatalog. Retrieved from 
http://icatalog.dau.mil/onlinecatalog/tabnav.aspx  
Defense Acquisition University (DAU). (2011a). 4th estate DACM: DAWIA Certification. Retrieved 
from http://www.dau.mil/doddacm/Pages/Certification.aspx  
Defense Acquisition University (DAU). (2011b). CON 216: Legal considerations in contracting. 
Retrieved from http://www.dau.mil  
Dupray, C. P. (2005). The coming transformation: Contracting organizations as professional service 
firms. Contract Management, 45(3), 6–13. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncmahq.org/files/Articles/7742D_CM_Mar05_p6.pdf  
Freytag, P. V., & Mikkelsen, O. S. (2007). Sourcing from outside—Six managerial challenges. Journal 
of Business and Industrial Marketing, 22(3), 187–195.  
GAO. (2011). Decision. Matter of: Northeast Military Sales, Inc. (Publication No.B-404153). Retrieved 
from http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/404153.pdf  
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=587 - 
=
General Services Administration (GSA). (2011). Federal acquisition regulations. Retrieved from 
http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffar1.htm 
Gopal, G., Viniak, V., & Caltagirone, J. (2004, November/December). A team approach to global 
sourcing. Supply Chain Management Review, 8(8), 54–59.  
Gortner, H. F., Mahler, J., & Nicholson, J. B. (1989). Organizational theory: A public perspective. 
Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing.  
Hawkins, T. G., Randall, W., & Wittmann, C. M. (2009). An empirical examination of reverse auction 
appropriateness in B2B source selection. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 45(4), 55–71. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1745-493X.2009.03176.x 
Heskett, J., Sasser, W., & Hart, C. (1990). Service breakthroughs. New York, NY: The Free Press. 
Hughes, J., & Wadd, J. (2012, January/February). Getting the most out of SRM. Supply Chain 
Management Review. 
Hult, G. T. M., Ferrell, O. C., & Schul, P. L. (1998). The effect of global leadership on purchasing 
process outcomes. European Journal of Marketing, 32(11/12), 1029–1043. 
Jack, E., & Powers, T. (2009). A review and synthesis of demand management, capacity 
management and performance in health-care services. International Journal of Management 
Reviews. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2370.2008.00235.x 
Johnson, C. (2005, May 20). Implementing strategic sourcing [Memorandum for chief acquisition 
officers, chief financial officers, chief information officers]. Washington, DC: Office of Budget and 
Management. 
Klassen, K., & Rohleder, T. (2001). Combining operations and marketing to manage capacity and 
demand in services. The Service Industries Journal, 21(2), 1–30. 
Klein, A. (2004). Three steps to excellence. Supply Management, 9(7), 22–25. Retrieved from 
http://www.supplymanagement.com/analysis/features/2004/three-steps-to-excellence/?locale=en  
Kocabasoglu, C., & Suresh, N. C. (2006). Strategic sourcing: An empirical investigation of the 
concept and its practices in U. S. manufacturing firms. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 
42(2), 4–16. doi: 10.1108/01443571211195736 
Mills, S. (2010). We don’t dance well: Government and industry defense materiel acquisition. Defense 
AT&L, 2(213), 28–33. Retrieved from http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/ATL%20Docs/Mar-
Apr10/datl_mar-apr10.pdf  
Mookherjee, S. N. (2008). Strategic sourcing: Need for a disciplined approach. The Icafai University 
Journal of Business Strategy, 2008(2), 71–76.  
Ogden, J. A., Rossetti, C. L., & Hendrick, T. E. (2007). An exploratory cross-country comparison of 
strategic purchasing. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 13, 2–16. doi: 
10.1016/j.pursup.2007.03.005 
Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is 
transforming the public sector. New York, NY: Penguin Group.  
Riphahn, T. R., Wambach, A., & Million, A. (2003). Incentive effects in the demand for health care: A 
bivariate panel count data estimation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18, 387–405. 
Simon, H. (1997). Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in administrative 
organizations (4th ed.). London, UK: The Free Press.  
Thawiwinyu, K., & Laptaned, U. (2009). The impact of strategic sourcing and E-procurement on 
supply chain performance management. China-USA Business Review, 8(8), 8–25. doi: 
10.1080/13602380903068071 
Strengers, Y. (2011). Beyond demand management: Co-managing energy and water practices with 
Australian households. Policy Studies, 32(1), 35–58. 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=588 - 
=
Towers, N., & Song, Y. (2010). Assessing the future challenges in strategic sourcing commodity from 
China: A case study analysis. Asia Pacific Business Review, 16(4), 527–544. 
doi:10.1080/13602380903068071 
Weber, M. (1922). Essays in sociology. In J. M Shafritz, A. C. Hyde, & S. J. Parkes, (Eds.), Classics 
of public administration (5th ed., pp. 50–55). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.  
Wilhite, H., et al. (2000). The legacy of twenty years of energy demand management: We know more 
about individual behaviour but next to nothing about demand. In E. Jochem (Ed.), Policy studies 
(p. 57). 
Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. New York, NY: 
Basic Books.  
Wisma, M., Schmidt, E., & Naimi, L. (2006). Factors to consider in strategic sourcing. Review of the 
Electronic & Industrial Distribution Industries, 5(2), 173–187. Retrieved from 
http://www.nedassoc.org/publications.php510.1108/03090569810243686  
Wright, P. D., Bretthauer, K. M., & Côté, M. J. (2006). Reexamining the nurse scheduling problem: 
Staffing ratios and nursing shortages. Decision Sciences, 37, 39–51. 
 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
RRR=aóÉê=oç~ÇI=fåÖÉêëçää=e~ää=
jçåíÉêÉóI=`^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.net=
 
